History / World War II Lesson 01

Why the German invasion of Russia failed

Soldiers of the largest invasion in history came close enough to see Moscow. The reasons they stopped have more to do with planning, supply and a shortage of almost everything than with winter alone.

About 23 minutes
7 parts
Free lesson
Part 1 of 7
~3 min
Part 1 of 7

The city they could almost see

German soldiers stood close enough to Moscow to make out its buildings. So why is Barbarossa remembered as the invasion that failed?

In the first days of December 1941, German officers on the edge of Moscow raised their binoculars and could pick out some of the city's buildings. A reconnaissance battalion had reached the railway station at Khimki, on the northern edge of the capital, and the bridge over the Moscow Volga Canal beside it. Sources measure the distance differently, from about eight kilometres from the city limits to about thirty from the Kremlin, but all agree on one thing. It was the closest any German force ever came. And within days, it was over.

Here is the puzzle. On 5 December the Red Army began a counterattack, and by 7 January 1942 it had pushed the German armies back by between 100 and 250 kilometres. How does an army that has captured Smolensk, taken Kiev, and captured around three million Soviet soldiers by early October end up stalled at the gates, then thrown back? On 3 July, only eleven days into the campaign, the army chief of staff Franz Halder had written in his diary that it was probably no overstatement to say the campaign had been won in fourteen days. (Translations of the German differ slightly in wording.)

Hitler himself offered the explanation. On 8 December he signed Directive 39, which ordered the army onto the defensive, and which blamed the early arrival of winter and the severe cold. It is a simple answer and a popular one. But historians who have studied the records give a different list: an army that was unprepared for a long campaign, poor knowledge of how strong the Soviet Union really was, severe supply problems, heavy losses, and a front stretched across a country far larger than the plan allowed for. The winter was real, and we will look at it. But it arrived late in the story.

So here is a better question, and the one this lesson tries to answer. Instead of asking what stopped the army, ask what an army needs in order to reach a city a thousand kilometres from its start, take it, and hold it, and which of those needs ran out first. That turns a story about a cold month into a story about how an army works.

22 JUNINVASION BEGINS 16 JULSMOLENSK TAKEN 19 SEPKIEV TAKEN 30 SEPDRIVE ON MOSCOW 31 OCTTHE HALT 5 DECCOUNTERATTACK
The two quiet stretches on this line are not winter. The first is between mid July and the end of September, when the drive on Moscow paused. The red stretch is the last ten weeks, from the start of the drive to the counterattack. Dates are for the central front.

Look at the line above. The campaign began on 22 June. Army Group Centre, the strongest of the three, captured Smolensk in mid July, and the great encirclement there closed on 5 August. Kiev fell on 19 September. Operation Typhoon, the drive on Moscow, began on 30 September, was halted on 31 October, resumed on 15 November and ended on 5 December. Notice where the longest pause is. It is not December. It is the weeks between Smolensk and Typhoon, when the drive on Moscow stopped while the army fought elsewhere and tried to catch its breath.

Over the next seven parts we will follow what the army needed. We start with a plan that matched reality, then the people and horses and vehicles to carry it out, then the railway, the weather, and an enemy willing and able to keep fighting. Each part opens on something that does not quite make sense and ends on a mechanism you could explain to someone else.

One thing needs saying plainly before we begin. This was not an ordinary war. Germany's leaders intended it to be a war of annihilation, and Part 2 says what that meant. We study the logistics of this invasion because understanding why it failed is part of understanding it, not because the failure makes its aims any less terrible.

And a warning about certainty. Historians still argue about how close Germany came. Where they disagree, we will say so.

Winter arrived to find an army that was already worn down.

Key idea

Ask what an army needed, not only what stopped it. Barbarossa did not fail on one bad day or one cold month. Several needs ran short at the same time, and winter came last.

Part 2 of 7

A plan for a short war

Everything about Barbarossa was built to last a few months. What did that assume, and who paid when it was wrong?

In the autumn of 1940, while Hitler was preparing to invade the Soviet Union, some of his own senior officers were writing him warnings. A memorandum argued that the eastern lands would only become an economic burden for Germany. General Friedrich Paulus, who would later command at Stalingrad, said that occupying western Russia would be more of a drain than a relief for the German economy. Hitler, according to accounts of the period, told Hermann Goering that he would no longer listen to misgivings about the economic dangers. So why did a plan go ahead that its own planners doubted?

The answer lies in what the plan assumed. Germany had just defeated France in weeks. The Red Army had performed poorly against Finland in the Winter War of 1939 and 1940, and Stalin's purges of the 1930s had removed many of its experienced officers. The historian Andreas Hillgruber argued that the plans were coloured by pride after France and by old German stereotypes of Russia as a primitive, backward country. Red Army soldiers were thought brave but the officers were held in contempt. Hitler is quoted as saying: "We only have to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure will come crashing down."

One result was that nobody prepared for a long campaign. Neither Hitler nor the General Staff expected a war that ran into the winter, so warm clothing was not distributed and tanks and artillery were not winterised. The plan itself called for three army groups to advance on three objectives at the same time. Army Group North would go through the Baltic lands toward Leningrad. Army Group Centre, with the most armour and air power, would strike for Smolensk and then Moscow. Army Group South would take Ukraine and push on toward the Caucasus and its oil. The official plan assumed that once the border battles were won, all three could advance freely to their goals without spreading thin.

BORDER, 22 JUN 1941 PLANNED LIMIT Army Group NorthLeningrad Army Group CentreMoscow Army Group SouthUkraine, then oil
Not to scale. A diagram of the plan: three thrusts, each with its own objective, all expected to move forward freely at the same time. Hitler ranked Leningrad first, the south second and Moscow third. Several of his generals disagreed.

Even the objectives were disputed. Hitler repeatedly said that Leningrad came first, the Donbas second and Moscow third. He thought Moscow was of no great importance and believed victory would come from destroying the Red Army west of the Dvina and Dnieper rivers. Guderian, Halder and the Army Group Centre commander Fedor von Bock believed the decisive blow could only be struck at Moscow. They could not persuade him. That disagreement did not stay on paper, as we will see.

We also need to be plain about the war aims, because they shaped the logistics. The invasion was meant to destroy the Soviet Union as a state and to seize land, food and oil. A secret plan called Generalplan Ost envisaged the expulsion, enslavement and killing of enormous numbers of Slavic people. A document known as the Hunger Plan described starving the populations of Soviet cities so that food could go to Germany. Special SS units called Einsatzgruppen followed the army to murder Jews and others. In the first six months they killed more than half a million Soviet Jews. Over the course of the war, about 3.3 million Soviet prisoners of war were deliberately starved to death or otherwise killed.

Here is where the aims met the logistics. The Hunger Plan assumed the army could feed itself from the occupied land while starving the cities. By late 1941, according to the standard account, the plan had been modified because it proved logistically untenable. In other words, the army's own supply problem undermined part of its murderous design. That is not a comfort. It is a reminder that this campaign was built on the idea that conquered people and land existed to be used, and that the idea did not survive contact with a country the size of the Soviet Union.

A popular story says that a delay in the invasion date doomed it. The plan was for 15 May, and the actual start was 22 June, a delay of 38 days, usually blamed on the campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece in April, and also on a wet spring that kept rivers in flood. William Shirer argued the delay was fatal. Many later historians think the 22 June start was early enough to reach Moscow by September, and Antony Beevor wrote that most historians accept it made little difference. The popular story may be the weakest explanation on the table.

A plan built for a few months was asked to carry an army through a year.

Key idea

A plan is a bundle of assumptions. Barbarossa assumed a short war, a weak enemy and no winter, and the whole bundle was tested at once.

Part 3 of 7

An army that mostly walked

The famous tanks were the tip of a very long, very slow spear.

The picture most of us carry of the invasion is a flood of tanks. Here is what the army actually looked like. The Germans deployed 153 divisions for Barbarossa. Of those, 104 were infantry divisions, and only 19 were panzer divisions and 15 were motorised infantry. In other words, a great majority of the army moved at the speed of a marching soldier. Behind them came horses, somewhere between 625,000 and 700,000 of them, hauling guns and wagons, set against about 600,000 motor vehicles. How does an army made mostly of walkers and horses keep up with tanks?

It does not, and the army knew it. The panzer groups were meant to cut deep, close great encirclements, and move on, while the infantry marched up behind them to hold what was taken. But the roads were poor, rain turned them to mud, and the distance between the spearheads and the walkers grew every day. On 29 June, Hitler, through Brauchitsch, ordered Bock to halt the panzers of Army Group Centre until the infantry caught up. Heinz Guderian, with the tacit support of Bock and Halder, ignored the order and kept going east, reporting his advance as a reconnaissance in force.

That small moment shows the whole tension. Speed was the German army's great advantage, and speed was also what pulled it apart. Every kilometre the tanks gained stretched the line behind them. And the successes themselves created work. When the panzers met near Minsk on 27 June, the Germans reported 324,000 Soviet prisoners taken. At Smolensk, upward of 300,000 were captured and more than 3,200 Soviet tanks destroyed. But a pocket has to be sealed by the tanks and then cleared by the infantry, and large numbers of Soviet soldiers escaped through gaps that lasted days. On 18 July the panzer groups were within ten kilometres of closing the trap at Smolensk, yet it was not closed until 5 August.

GERMAN DIVISIONS FOR BARBAROSSA, BY TYPE InfantryDIVISIONS104 PanzerDIVISIONS19 Motorised infantryDIVISIONS15
The invasion force also included nine security divisions, four divisions in Finland and two in reserve, which are not shown. Horses numbered roughly 625,000 to 700,000, against about 600,000 motor vehicles. Counts of equipment vary between sources.

Now add a simple piece of arithmetic, using invented round numbers so you can see how the problem grows. Suppose a truck carries 10 units of fuel and burns 1 unit for every 100 kilometres it drives, in each direction. If the army is 100 kilometres from the railhead, a round trip burns 2 units and the truck delivers 8. At 300 kilometres it burns 6 and delivers 4. At 500 kilometres it burns all 10 on the round trip and delivers nothing. Real trucks carried more and burned less, but the shape is the same. The farther the army gets from the railway, the more of every delivery is eaten by the delivering.

The people paid for it as well. By 2 August, about six weeks in, all three army groups had suffered 179,500 casualties but had received only 47,000 replacements. Boots and winter uniforms were already short. By the end of October, only about a third of the army's motor vehicles still worked, and the infantry divisions were down to between a third and a half of their strength. By 15 November only 135,000 of the 600,000 trucks available on 22 June were still available.

Four weeks in, General Bock came to a conclusion that other German commanders were reaching too. The Red Army was putting up stiff opposition, and German difficulties were also due to logistical problems with reinforcements and provisions. The army slowed to resupply. That pause, in July and August, is the one the timeline in Part 1 shows. It was not caused by weather. It was caused by an army outrunning what it could supply.

We should be careful with numbers here. Counts of German equipment in the reference works vary widely, for example from about 7,200 to more than 23,000 artillery pieces depending on what is counted, and from about 2,770 to more than 4,300 aircraft. The ranges quoted in this lesson are the ones the sources give, and the pattern holds across all of them.

The spearhead was steel. The shaft behind it was boots and horses.

Key idea

Speed has a price. The faster the tanks ran ahead, the longer the line the infantry, horses and trucks had to cover, and the more the army wore itself out keeping up.

Part 4 of 7

Nine centimetres of track

A gap smaller than your hand stopped trains at the old border.

Here is a small number with a large effect. A railway track has a gauge, which is the distance between the two rails. German and most European railways used a standard gauge of 1,435 millimetres. Soviet railways in 1941 used a gauge of five feet, or 1,524 millimetres. The difference is 89 millimetres, less than nine centimetres, narrower than the width of a hand. It sounds trivial. Why would a gap that small matter to an army of three million people?

Because railway wheels are fixed to their axles at a set width. A train built for one gauge cannot run on the other, however close they are. The Russian Empire had chosen the five foot gauge in 1843, and the Soviet Union kept it. (In 1970 Soviet Railways redefined the gauge as 1,520 millimetres, which is why you often see 85 millimetres quoted for the difference. For 1941, 89 is the figure.) So at the old border, a German supply train had to stop. Its cargo had to be unloaded and moved to Soviet wagons, or the track had to be rebuilt to the German standard by moving one rail.

The Germans did rebuild track as they advanced, and on a huge scale. Figures vary by source and by date. A figure often repeated is that more than sixteen thousand kilometres of Soviet track had been converted by early October 1941, while other accounts give totals between fifteen thousand and more than twenty thousand kilometres by the end of the year. The Soviet side made it harder. As they retreated, the Red Army and the Soviet railways withdrew or destroyed most of their rolling stock. By one account, captured wagons could be adapted to the German gauge but locomotives could not, so the Germans had to run two railway systems side by side.

TRACK WIDTH, BETWEEN THE RAILS, TO SCALE German standard gauge1,435 MMSoviet gauge in 1941FIVE FEET, 1,524 MM89millimetres of differenceTHE GOLD STRETCH ON THE SOVIET BAR
The bars are drawn to true scale, and the gold stretch is the difference. After 1970 Soviet Railways redefined their gauge as 1,520 mm, which is why you will often see a difference of 85 mm quoted. Either way, the gap is under nine centimetres.

Think of what that does to a supply line. The gauge break is a bottleneck, and it moves. Each time the front advanced and the tracks behind it were converted, the point where trains had to hand over to trucks moved east. The farther it moved from the army, the more the army depended on trucks to bridge the gap, and trucks, as Part 3 showed, wear out and burn their own fuel. German railway troops and the national railway worked hard, though by some accounts loads were still held up for days at the break.

The scorched earth made it worse. As the German armies came forward, Russian peasants fled ahead of them, burning their harvested crops, driving off cattle and destroying buildings so the invaders could not live off the land. The plan had counted on the land to feed an army, and the land was being emptied in front of it.

We can see the result late in the story. In December, when Guderian protested to Hitler that losses from the cold were greater than combat losses, he pointed out that the army's winter equipment was held up by traffic jams in Poland. The clothing existed. It was stuck on the way. That is what a long, mismatched, overloaded supply line looks like from the front: not an empty warehouse, but a full one hundreds of kilometres behind you.

We should not turn one number into the whole explanation. Historians weigh the railway differently, and some put more stress on roads and trucks, or on the sheer distance. The gauge is not the single cause. It is the clearest example of a pattern: the army met a country that had been built to different standards and then deliberately made harder to use.

A gap of under nine centimetres turned a railway into a bottleneck.

Key idea

Standards matter. A tiny mismatch between two systems forced supplies to be reloaded or the track rebuilt at the break, and the break moved east as the army did.

Part 5 of 7

Mud, then cold

Winter gets the blame. The record shows an army already worn down before the worst of it.

Here is a puzzle about the weather. The winter of 1941 and 1942 was the coldest of the twentieth century in Europe, and German soldiers froze, and yet the Red Army fought in the same winter and attacked in it. If cold alone decided things, it should have hit both sides alike. And if you try to find out how cold it actually was, you get very different answers. On 30 November Bock reported to Berlin a temperature of 45 below zero Celsius. General Erhard Raus kept a daily record in his war diary that shows between 36 and 38 below zero during 4 to 7 December, though how he measured it is not known. Zhukov recalled that the cold of November was only 7 to 10 below. The official Soviet weather records show that the lowest December temperature was 28.8 below zero.

So the cold was severe, but the numbers disagree, and the strongest claims do not match the official records. That is worth knowing before we blame the weather. Something came before the cold, and it was mud. Operation Typhoon began on 30 September, and almost from the start the weather worsened. Temperatures fell, rain fell, and the unpaved roads turned to mud. Snow came and then more rain, creating a glutinous mud that German tanks had trouble crossing, while the Soviet T34 tank, with its wider tracks, did better. On 31 October the German high command ordered a halt.

Notice what the pause gave the other side. In a little over a month the Soviets organised eleven new armies, including divisions brought from Siberia. More than a thousand tanks and a thousand aircraft arrived to help defend Moscow, according to one account. The Germans knew reinforcements were arriving, but given the scale of Soviet losses they did not expect them to hold. By 15 November the ground had frozen, the mud problem was solved, and the Germans attacked again.

TEMPERATURES REPORTED NEAR MOSCOW, DEGREES C BELOW ZERO ZhukovNOVEMBER, MEMOIRS7 to 10 below Soviet weather recordsLOWEST IN DECEMBER28.8 below General Raus4 TO 7 DECEMBER, DIARY36 to 38 below Field Marshal BockREPORT, 30 NOVEMBER45 below
These four sources give very different figures, and the methods behind some of them are unknown. Official Soviet records show nothing as cold as Bock reported. All agree it was a severe winter, and the coldest of the twentieth century in Europe.

But the army that attacked on 15 November was not the army that had started in June. By late October only a third of its motor vehicles were working, and its infantry divisions were at between a third and a half strength. There had been no improvement in supply: only 135,000 of 600,000 trucks were still available. Ammunition and fuel had to come first, ahead of food and winter clothing, so soldiers looted what they could from local people, and even that was not enough. In the south, near Tula, German troops who still had no winter clothing were advancing only five to ten kilometres a day.

Then the real cold came. German troops were freezing without winter clothing, using equipment that was not designed for such low temperatures. More than 130,000 cases of frostbite were reported among German soldiers. Frozen grease had to be cleaned out of every loaded shell, and vehicles had to be heated for hours before they would start. The cold hit Soviet troops too, but they were better prepared, although they also faced shortages of winter clothing. German soldiers supplemented their own clothing with coats and boots taken from Soviet dead.

Here is the strongest evidence that the weather was not the whole story. Guderian, the panzer general, told Hitler in December that losses from the cold were greater than combat losses, and that winter equipment was held up in Poland. He was not blaming the weather alone. He was blaming the winter and the failure to prepare for it, which were both part of the plan from Part 2. Hitler's Directive 39 named the early winter and the severe cold as the main reasons for the failure, whereas historians point to German military unpreparedness, poor intelligence about Soviet strength, extensive logistical difficulties, high attrition, heavy casualties and overextension.

So we can hold two things at once. The winter was real, extreme and deadly. And the army met it already depleted, short of vehicles, clothing and men. Weather does not decide a campaign alone. It finds the weak points that planning left.

Winter was real. It was also the explanation Hitler preferred.

Key idea

The cold was severe, but the army met it already thinned and short of vehicles and winter clothing. Blaming the weather alone hides the shortages that came first.

Part 6 of 7

The other side of the line

While the German army ran down, the Soviet Union was rebuilding behind Moscow. How?

Now look at the other side. After the Battle of Kiev, in September, the Red Army no longer outnumbered the Germans and had no more trained reserves close at hand. To defend Moscow, Stalin could field about 800,000 men in 83 divisions, but no more than 25 of those divisions were fully effective. Then came the Vyazma pocket in early October, which alone yielded over 500,000 prisoners and brought the total since the invasion began to three million. By one account, the Soviets then had only about 90,000 men and 150 tanks left for the defence of Moscow. Martial law was declared in the city on 13 October. And yet on 5 December the Red Army attacked with 1.1 million men. Where did they come from?

Part of the answer is a spy. Richard Sorge, a Soviet agent in Tokyo, reported that Imperial Japan had no plans to invade the Soviet Union in the near future. With that worry lifted, Stalin was able to move divisions from Siberia and the Far East. Sources give different counts for how many, between 18 and 30 divisions, and between about 1,000 and 1,700 tanks. What is not in doubt is that fresh troops and tanks came west by rail during October and November, at the very moment the German advance was stuck in mud.

Another part of the answer is how the defence was arranged. By the time of the second German offensive in November, the Soviet rifle divisions held a much stronger position than in October: a triple defensive ring around the city, with most field armies holding a layered defence with at least two divisions in second line positions, and artillery and engineers concentrated along the roads the Germans were expected to use. Soviet troops, and especially officers, were by then more experienced. On the 7th of November, Stalin ordered the traditional Revolution Day parade in Red Square, and the troops marched from the parade straight to the front.

SOVIET FORCES AVAILABLE FOR MOSCOW, FROM THE REFERENCE ACCOUNTS Before TyphoonLATE SEPTEMBER, MEN800,000 After the Vyazma pocketMID OCTOBER, MEN90,000 The counterattack5 DECEMBER, MEN1,100,000
These are figures reported in standard accounts, and they count different things at different times, so they are not strictly like for like. Only about 25 of the 83 divisions before Typhoon were fully effective. The pattern is the point: near collapse, then a rebuilt force.

A third part of the answer is the factories. From the first days of the invasion, a vast operation moved Soviet industry and people eastward. Estimates cluster around 1,500 factories relocated, though figures vary by source, and estimates of the number of people moved range from around ten million to around seventeen million. A committee to organise it was set up on 24 June. Tanks and aircraft produced behind the Urals would reach the front in 1942, and Soviet armaments production dramatically increased in that year.

None of this was smooth, and none of it was inevitable. Stalin had received intelligence of the coming attack in early 1941 and did not order a mobilisation, fearing that it might provoke Germany. When the invasion came, many Soviet units were poorly positioned and understrength. On the Soviet side, discipline became ferocious. Dmitry Pavlov, the commander on the western front, was relieved on 30 June and tried and executed on 22 July with members of his staff on charges of cowardice and criminal incompetence. NKVD blocking groups were ready to shoot soldiers retreating without orders. And in early November, over Zhukov's objections that there were no reserves, Stalin ordered several counterattacks that were mostly repelled and used up forces that could have helped defend Moscow.

So the Soviet victory was not a matter of an unstoppable force or an empty land. It was a country that nearly broke, then used its depth, its railways running the other way, its intelligence, and its willingness to pay a terrible price. When the counterattack began on 5 December, the forces involved only slightly outnumbered the Germans, but careful deployment gave a ratio of two to one at critical points. By 12 December the Soviets had retaken Solnechnogorsk, and Klin on 15 December.

Notice the symmetry with Part 3. The German army was longest where its supply was weakest, near Moscow. The Soviet army was strongest where its supply was shortest, because its reinforcements were coming toward the city, not away from it. A defender backed against its own capital has the advantage of the shortest line.

The Red Army was nearly broken in October. By December it was attacking.

Key idea

The Soviet recovery came from depth: reserves from the east, a defence in layers, factories moved out of reach, and a supply line that shortened as the Germans came closer.

Part 7 of 7

What actually ended the offensive

Add it up, and see why historians still argue about how close it was.

After the offensive stopped, Guderian wrote in his journal: "The offensive on Moscow failed. We underestimated the enemy's strength, as well as his size and climate." Look at what the army looked like by then. On 22 June 1941 the German army had 209 divisions, of which 163 were fit to attack. By 31 March 1942 the army could field only 58 divisions fit for offensive operations. The invasion had cost the German army more than 830,000 men. So here is the question that historians still argue over. Was Moscow ever within reach? And if it was, when did the chance slip away?

One answer blames Hitler. In August, when Army Group Centre stood at Smolensk, Bock, Halder and nearly all the generals argued for a full drive on Moscow, which they said was the capital, a centre of arms production, a hub of communications and a transport junction, and where intelligence said the bulk of the remaining Red Army was gathered. Hitler instead sent the tanks of Army Group Centre north and south. Kiev, in the south, fell on 19 September in what was a huge victory by the numbers: Soviet losses there are estimated at over 600,000 killed, captured or missing, about 480,000 of them prisoners.

The other answer says the choice was less free than it looks. The historian David Stahel, in a study based on the German archives, argues that the German army lost the war in the first months, because its most mobile divisions were ground down from July to August, so that Barbarossa was in serious trouble before Typhoon ever began. A reviewer of his work notes that even in August 1941, with the supply system greatly overextended and the army group's strength widely scattered and the refit of its panzer divisions incomplete, the generals argued for an offensive on Moscow that was in practical terms impossible to carry out. Kiev, Stahel argues, was a victory that carried a price.

GERMAN ARMY DIVISIONS FIT FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 22 June 1941DIVISIONS FIT TO ATTACK163 31 March 1942DIVISIONS FIT TO ATTACK58
The German army as a whole had 209 divisions on 22 June 1941. The count of those able to attack fell by about two thirds in nine months.

There is a third possibility, which is that Moscow could have been taken and it would not have mattered as much as the generals thought. Hitler believed Moscow was of no great importance and that victory would come from destroying the Red Army west of the capital. The Soviet state had evacuated much of its industry eastward and its remaining reserves lay behind the city. Whether the fall of Moscow would have broken Soviet resistance is a counterfactual that no one can settle, and serious historians have argued each way.

What historians agree on is what happened next. The failure of the quick victory reversed Germany's fortunes. Having failed to win in 1941, Germany attacked in 1942 on a much narrower front, in Case Blue, and was beaten at Stalingrad. A final large offensive at Kursk in 1943 failed against a Soviet force that knew it was coming. The war on the Eastern Front, the largest and deadliest land war in history, ended in Berlin in 1945. Hitler took personal command of the army on 19 December 1941, after dismissing Brauchitsch, and Guderian and Bock were dismissed within days.

Here is the whole mechanism in one breath, which is the test of whether you understand it. A plan built for a short war assumed a weak enemy and no winter. The army was mostly infantry and horses, and the tanks outran them. The railway was a different gauge and the land was burned ahead of it, so supplies had to be reloaded, rebuilt and trucked, and the trucks wore out. Mud stopped the advance in October, and the pause let the Soviets rebuild. By the time the real cold came, the army was thinned, short of clothing and short of vehicles, and it met a Red Army reinforced from the east with the defence laid out in depth.

A last caution. The campaign did not end because of a clever Soviet general or a mistake by Hitler alone. It ended because several things went wrong together, each one making the others worse, and a country the size of the Soviet Union had room to absorb the blow and rebuild. If you take one question from this lesson, take this one: not what stopped the army, but what the army needed, and which of those needs failed first.

Barbarossa did not fail on one bad day. It ran short of one thing after another.

Key idea

Several shortages, a plan built on wishes, and an enemy with depth combined to stop the German army short of Moscow. Winter was the last of them, not the first.

The lesson
What you can now explain
  • Why the army that took Smolensk and Kiev stalled in front of Moscow, and why winter was the last cause, not the first.
  • What the plan assumed, and why a short war was a bet, not a certainty.
  • Why tanks outran the walking army behind them, and what that did to supply.
  • How a gap of under nine centimetres between rails turned a railway into a bottleneck.
  • Why the Soviet Union could rebuild near Moscow while the German army ran down.
  • Where historians disagree about how close Germany came.

Where these facts come from. The figures and dates in this lesson come from standard reference histories of the campaign, checked against each other, including the accounts of the invasion, the Battle of Moscow, the Battle of Kiev and the Soviet evacuation. Diary and memoir quotations are shown as they appear in those histories: Franz Halder's war diary for 3 July 1941, Heinz Guderian's journal and Hitler's Directive 39. Translations differ in small ways. I have not read these primary texts directly.

Where historians disagree. David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East, argues the campaign was lost in the summer of 1941. Andreas Hillgruber's 1978 essay stresses the pride and prejudice behind the plan. Antony Beevor and others doubt that the delay to 22 June mattered much, while William Shirer thought it did. Numbers for equipment, the railway conversion, Soviet reserves and temperatures differ between sources, and this lesson gives ranges where they do.

The Hunger Plan, Generalplan Ost and the mass killing of Soviet prisoners and civilians are documented historical facts, described here because they are part of what the invasion was.

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