The leg and the lamp
Ancient writers tell us different stories about the limp of Epictetus. What do we actually know about the man?
A second century writer named Celsus, whose words survive only because a Christian writer named Origen quoted them to argue against him, tells a story about a slave. His master was twisting the slave's leg. The slave said calmly that he would break it. The master kept twisting, and the leg broke. And the slave said, in one translation: "Did I not tell you that you would break it?" The slave, Celsus says, was Epictetus. It is one of the most repeated stories in the history of philosophy.
Here is the puzzle. Another ancient writer, Simplicius, who wrote a commentary on Epictetus's handbook in the sixth century, says only that Epictetus was weak in body and lame from early childhood. He says nothing about a master breaking his leg. The nineteenth century translator George Long, writing the introduction to his own English edition, told readers that it was better to trust Simplicius. So the best known fact about the man may be a legend, or it may be true, and the surviving evidence cannot settle it.
What we can say with more confidence is this. Epictetus was born around AD 50 in Hierapolis, in Phrygia, which is in modern Turkey, near Pamukkale. His parents' names are unknown. The name by which we know him, Epiktetos, is a Greek word meaning "gained" or "acquired". He spent his youth in Rome as the slave of Epaphroditus, a freedman who worked for the emperor Nero. And his owner allowed him to study Stoic philosophy under a famous teacher, Musonius Rufus.
Why would a master educate a slave? Long, quoting a French scholar, offers one explanation. Wealthy Romans of the period liked to own educated slaves, such as poets, rhetoricians and philosophers, in the way that rich people in later centuries collected libraries. If that is right, the education of Epictetus may say more about his owner's vanity than about his kindness. It is a reasonable guess, and it is only a guess.
Look at the timeline above, and notice how little of it is firm. Nero died in 68 AD, and Epictetus was freed at some point after that, though when and how are unknown. He then began teaching in Rome. Around AD 89 to 93, depending on which source you follow, the emperor Domitian banished the philosophers from the city, and Epictetus moved to Nicopolis, a city in northwestern Greece, where he opened a school and taught until he was an old man.
The details we have about his life there are small and humane. He lived simply, with few possessions. He lived alone for a long time, but in old age he took in the child of a friend who would otherwise have been left to die, and raised the boy with the help of a woman. He died around AD 135. After his death, according to the satirist Lucian, an admirer bought his oil lamp for 3,000 drachmae, a large sum for a lamp. People wanted something that had lit his work.
And here is the strangest fact of all. Epictetus never wrote a word. Everything we have comes from his student Arrian, who attended his lectures around AD 108 and published what he heard. Arrian says he wrote down whatever he heard Epictetus say, word for word, as best he could. Some scholars have doubted that claim, but it is the majority view that the Discourses really do come from his lectures. Only four of the eight books are preserved.
So where should we look for him, if the biography is thin? In the ideas. This lesson follows what he taught, using his own words as Arrian recorded them, and flags the places where the sources are uncertain. The question is no longer whether the leg broke. It is how a man who began as someone's property came to teach that nobody can take away your freedom, and whether he was right.
The best known fact about Epictetus may be a legend, and his best known idea does not depend on it.
We know little for certain about the life of Epictetus. We know his ideas well, because a student wrote them down. Start with the ideas, and treat the famous stories with care.
What is up to us
How can a man who was owned by someone else claim to be free? He starts by sorting the world into two piles.
Here is the sentence that opens Epictetus's handbook, the Enchiridion, in the translation by Thomas Wentworth Higginson: "There are things which are within our power, and there are things which are beyond our power." Then he gives both lists. Within our power are opinion, aim, desire and aversion, and in one word, whatever affairs are our own. Beyond our power are body, property, reputation and office, and in one word, whatever are not properly our own affairs.
Read that again slowly, because it contains a puzzle. Your body is not within your power? You can move your arm. But think about illness, injury, age, and what happens if someone seizes you. Epictetus is not saying you do nothing with your body. He is saying you do not fully command what becomes of it. And your reputation, your property, the office you hold, all depend on other people and on events. What is wholly yours is the way you judge, what you aim at, what you want and what you try to avoid.
Why is this sorting useful? He explains it in the second chapter. Desire demands to get what it wants, and aversion demands to avoid what it fears. If you want something that is not in your power, you can be disappointed. If you fear something that is not in your power, such as sickness, poverty or death, you can be made wretched. But if you point your wanting and your fearing only at what is yours, there is nothing outside you that can make you fail. The modern name for this is the dichotomy of control. It is a modern label. Epictetus just says some things are within our power and some are not.
Now try it, with an invented example. Suppose you are going to a job interview. How well you prepare is within your power. How honestly you answer is within your power. How you behave if you are turned down is within your power. Whether the interviewers choose you is not. They may have a candidate in mind already. The effort and the character are yours, and the outcome belongs to other people and to chance. Sorting this way does not mean you stop caring about the job. It means you know where to put your effort.
His most famous demonstration of the idea is in the Discourses, in the translation by George Long. A man threatens him with chains. Epictetus answers: "You may fetter my leg, but my will not even Zeus himself can overpower." The man says he will throw him into prison. Epictetus replies: "My poor body, you mean." Then comes the threat of beheading, and Epictetus says: "When then have I told you that my head alone cannot be cut off?" He is not claiming to be unkillable. He is saying that the power to be killed is not the power to make him think what the killer wants him to think.
He tells a story about a Stoic named Agrippinus to show how this looks in daily life. Agrippinus was told that his trial was being heard in the Senate. He said he hoped it would go well, but that it was the fifth hour of the day, and the time for his exercise and cold bath, so he went and took them. Afterwards a messenger came and said he had been condemned. "To banishment," Agrippinus asked, "or to death?" To banishment. "What about my property?" It was not taken from him. "Let us go to Aricia then," he said, "and dine."
We should be honest about what this is and is not. It is a way of directing effort. It is not a proof that bad things do not matter, and Epictetus never says that. He says that the part of a bad event you can steer is your judgment and your action, and that steering that part well is what freedom consists of. Whether that is a satisfying account of freedom is something the rest of this lesson tests.
Sort what is yours from what is not, and put all your effort on the first pile.
Epictetus divides the world into what is within our power, which is our opinions, aims, desires and aversions, and what is not, which is body, property, reputation and office. Peace begins by knowing which is which.
It is not things, but views
Two people can meet the same event and feel very differently. Epictetus says the difference lives in one small step.
Here is a claim in chapter five of the Enchiridion that sounds almost too simple. "Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of things." Then he gives an example that his listeners would have found startling: "Thus death is nothing terrible, else it would have appeared so to Socrates. But the terror consists in our notion of death, that it is terrible." He is pointing at a fact. Socrates, according to the account Plato gave, faced his death with calm. If death were terrible in itself, it should have terrified him as well.
Notice the shape of the argument. If the same event produced the same feeling in everyone, we could say the event causes the feeling. But it does not. In chapter sixteen he asks us to imagine seeing someone weeping because their son has gone abroad. The thing to say to yourself, he says, is this: "What hurts this man is not this occurrence itself, for another man might not be hurt by it, but the view he chooses to take of it." The word to notice is the last one. Chosen. Views, in his sense, are something we do.
So what is the step in between? In the first chapter he gives a practical tool. Train yourself to say to every unwelcome appearance: "You are but a semblance and by no means the real thing." The first reaction, he is saying, is an impression, a first appearance of how things seem. Only then comes the judgment, where you decide what the impression means and what it deserves. Between the two is a gap, and his whole method is to widen that gap and stand in it.
The example in the diagram is invented, but you will recognise it. A friend does not answer your message. One judgment is that he dislikes you, and the feeling that follows is hurt. Another judgment is that he is busy, and the feeling is calm. The event is the same. The judgments differ, and so do the feelings. Epictetus does not say which judgment is true. He says that you often adopt the first one without noticing you chose, and that noticing is the beginning of freedom.
He is careful about a point people often miss. This is not a recommendation to feel nothing. In the same chapter sixteen he adds that in conversation with a grieving person you should not disdain to accommodate yourself to them and, if need be, to groan with them. Then he adds a warning: take heed not to groan inwardly, too. The sympathy is allowed. What he asks is that you do not let your own mind sink into the same false judgment.
Chapter eight gives the principle in one line: "Demand not that events should happen as you wish; but wish them to happen as they do happen, and you will go on well." Here the reading can go wrong. It does not mean you cannot try to change things. It means your peace should not depend on the events obeying you. You can work to prevent a flood and still not rage at the water.
There is a limit to the claim, and Epictetus would admit it if asked. Some events do real harm, and the judgment that they are bad is correct. A view of things can be mistaken, but it can also be right. What he teaches is a test: before you accept an impression as true, ask what it asserts, and whether it is about something within your power. If it concerns something beyond your power, he says, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.
Between what happens and what you feel, there is a gap, and the gap is yours.
Epictetus says we are disturbed not by things but by the views we take of them. The first appearance of an event is an impression. The meaning you give it is a judgment, and that step can be examined.
Freedom for a man who was owned
A former slave tells you that being freed in law does not make you free. What does he mean, and what does he leave out?
In the Discourses, Epictetus describes the ceremony by which a Roman owner freed a slave. The owner turned his slave around before the praetor, a Roman magistrate, and paid a tax called the twentieth. Then Epictetus asks a hard question about it. When a man has done this, "is not the man who has gone through this ceremony become free?" His answer: "No more than he is become free from perturbations." This was said by a man who was himself freed from slavery at some point, though we do not know how.
What does he mean? He is using the words slave and free in a second sense. In the first sense they describe a legal status, owned or not owned. In the second sense they describe whether anything outside yourself can control what you want, fear and decide. He defines freedom this way: "Is freedom anything else than the power of living as we choose?" And then he asks us who among the free has no master. "Is not money your master," he asks the man who owns slaves, "or a girl or a boy, or some tyrant or some friend of the tyrant?"
In the Enchiridion he states the principle in chapter fourteen: "A man's master is he who is able to confer or remove whatever that man seeks or shuns. Whoever then would be free, let him wish nothing, let him decline nothing, which depends on others; else he must necessarily be a slave." Read it as a chain of dependence. If you need a person's approval, that person owns a part of you. If you cannot bear to lose money, money owns a part of you. The way out, he says, is not to seize those things harder but to stop making your peace depend on them.
This is a striking argument, and it needs to be read with the context in view. Under Roman law, slaves were property and had no legal personhood. Unlike citizens, they could by law be subjected to corporal punishment, sexual exploitation, torture and summary execution, and their food, shelter and health depended on how useful their owners thought them. Skilled and educated slaves, such as Epictetus, occupied a more privileged tier, with defined paths to freedom. Epictetus lived inside this system. His own words show it: in chapter twelve he assumes a reader who might want to punish a servant, and says it is better that your servant should be bad than that you should be unhappy. The advice is about the master's peace of mind.
So what should we make of his idea of freedom? There are two honest reactions, and serious people hold both. One is admiration. For someone with no power to change his situation, a way to keep his dignity and his judgment from being owned is a real resource, and the Stoics were, among other things, teachers of endurance under tyranny. Musonius Rufus, the teacher of Epictetus, was exiled more than once, including to the harsh island of Gyaros, and survived there by forming a small community of philosophers.
The other reaction is a question. If freedom means the inner power of living as you choose, does the idea leave the outer chains in place? In the passages we have read, Epictetus does not argue that slavery should be ended. He uses its language to talk about the mind. A critic can say that this makes injustice easier to accept. A defender can say that he was teaching what could be done by anyone, in a world he could not change. Both are describing the same text.
We cannot settle that by reading one man. But notice what he does not do. He does not say the enslaved are free because their minds can be. He says the legally free are not free if they are ruled by wanting. The argument is aimed first at the people who thought they were free, and it is an argument about power over oneself, not a defence of owning another.
A man's master is whoever can give or take what he wants.
Epictetus argues that real freedom is the power to live as we choose, and that anyone ruled by wanting what others control is a slave in that sense. The idea is powerful, and it leaves open what it does not say about slavery itself.
The teacher's teacher
The philosophy came from somewhere. Who handed it to Epictetus, and how did it reach us?
It is easy to think of Epictetus as a lone voice. He was the end of a long line. Stoicism was founded in Athens by Zeno of Citium around 300 BC, and it takes its name from the Stoa Poikile, the painted colonnade where its teachers spoke in public. It grew out of an older tradition called Cynicism, which valued living simply, and it flourished through the Greek and Roman world until the third century AD. By the time of Epictetus it was already about four hundred years old.
The man who taught him was Gaius Musonius Rufus, a Roman Stoic born in Etruria between 20 and 30 AD. Under Nero, Musonius was famous in Rome as a Stoic teacher and was linked to the Stoic opposition to the emperor. In 65 AD he was banished to the island of Gyaros on a charge of taking part in the Pisonian conspiracy, which appears to have been trumped up. He came back under Galba, and when the emperor Vespasian banished the other philosophers in 71 AD, Musonius was allowed to stay, though he was banished anyway about four years later. A collection of extracts from his lectures survives.
Why does this matter? Because it shows what kind of philosophy this was. It was not a seminar in a quiet garden. It was a practice taught by people who were sometimes exiled by emperors, to students who were sometimes slaves. Musonius, in the surviving extracts, talked about living well in daily life. His student took that emphasis and pushed it further: Epictetus said philosophy is a way of life and not just a theoretical subject.
Now to how it reached us. Everything we have of Epictetus comes through Arrian, a young man who attended his lectures around AD 108 and who later became a Roman official and historian. Arrian says in the preface to the Discourses that whatever he heard Epictetus say, he wrote down word for word, as best he could, for his own later use. The Discourses were originally in eight books and four survive. Arrian also made a short digest, the Enchiridion, or handbook, which became the most widely read piece.
Look at what that means for the voice. The Discourses read like speech, because they were speech. Long, the translator, notes that the lectures were probably delivered off the cuff, so one thought leads to the next, and sometimes the connection is hard to follow. That is why the text can seem repetitive, blunt and sometimes irritated with his students. When one student offered to show how closely he had studied a treatise, Epictetus compared him to an athlete who shows his weights instead of his shoulders. He wanted to see the effect, he said: how the student handled desire and aversion in real life.
Arrian compared his Discourses to the Socratic writings, the dialogues in which Plato and Xenophon preserved the speech of a teacher who wrote nothing. It is an apt comparison, though not a perfect one. We should hold the evidence at the right level of confidence. Epictetus is known to us through a pupil's notes, which may be faithful, or may be shaped by Arrian's own hand. Most scholars treat them as a fairly close record of the lectures.
The handbook was valued in later centuries, and it reached readers as different as a sixth century commentator, Simplicius, and French writers of the Enlightenment. By the French eighteenth century, writers such as Voltaire and Diderot had met him as students, through the Enchiridion, as the author of a short, portable book of rules for living. The man had become a book, which is where we meet him.
He taught for a lifetime and wrote nothing, so everything we know is a pupil's memory of his voice.
Epictetus stands at the end of a four hundred year tradition and reached us through a pupil's notes. That makes his teaching vivid, and it means we should say where the evidence is thinner than the confidence of the text.
The emperor's copy
A slave's lectures ended up in an emperor's private notes. How, and what does it show?
The most powerful man in the Roman world in the second half of the second century kept a private notebook. It is now called the Meditations, and it was written by the emperor Marcus Aurelius, who ruled from AD 161 to 180. The twelve books are in Greek, and he wrote them for his own guidance and self improvement. It is unlikely he ever meant them to be published. Internal notes show that some were written on campaign: the first book is marked as written in the country of the Quadi, by the river Granova, and the second at Carnuntum, both on the Danube frontier.
Here is the puzzle. An emperor writing private notes on how to behave, and a former slave lecturing in a provincial Greek city, seem to be at opposite ends of the Roman world. Yet one of the earliest entries in Marcus's book is a list of thanks to the people who shaped him. In it he thanks his teacher Rusticus, among other things, for teaching him not to rest satisfied with a light and superficial knowledge, and then adds that he must thank him that he ever came across Epictetus's notes, which Rusticus gave him from his own collection.
That line is from the Casaubon translation of 1634, and its wording is old. The meaning is plain. A Stoic teacher in Rome passed along a copy of Epictetus's lecture notes to a young man who would become emperor. Marcus never met Epictetus. He was about fourteen when Epictetus died, and he knew him only through the notes of others. But the notes mattered enough that the emperor, near the start of his own book, gave credit for them.
Marcus does not only thank him. He quotes him. In the Meditations there is a passage attributed to Epictetus: "Of the free will there is no thief or robber." It is the same idea we met in Part 2, said in ten words. What you decide, and the way you choose to see things, cannot be stolen. It is not hard to see why a man with enormous power over others, and no power over death or illness or his empire's fortunes, might want to remind himself of it.
It is also worth noticing what the emperor did not copy. Marcus was not a slave, and the problem he faced was almost the opposite: absolute power, endless duties, and the temptation to confuse his office with himself. The philosophy that taught a slave to keep his judgment his own taught an emperor to keep his judgment his own too, in a very different position. That is some evidence that the idea was about the human condition and not only about one social class.
There is a story that the emperor Hadrian was friendly with Epictetus. The sources suggest that Hadrian may have heard him speak at his school in Nicopolis, and a later text, a dialogue between the emperor and the philosopher, was popular in the Middle Ages. That dialogue is a fiction, probably written in the second or third century, and we should not read it as a record. What is likely is that the philosopher was known and respected in his lifetime.
So we have a pattern worth remembering. The ideas of a man who started life as someone's property reached the private notes of the most powerful man in the world, who read them as a guide to being a better person. Whether the emperor lived up to them is a separate question, and historians argue about that. The point for this lesson is how widely the idea travelled, and who found it useful.
The same idea comforted a slave and steadied an emperor.
Marcus Aurelius, who never met Epictetus, thanks his teacher for passing on Epictetus's notes and quotes him in the Meditations. The idea of an inner freedom no one can steal was useful at both ends of Roman society.
What it asks, and what it costs
Epictetus has a modern afterlife, and a hard edge. Where does the idea help, and where does it go too far?
In the twentieth century, some of the founders of modern psychotherapy went back to the Stoics. Albert Ellis, who developed an approach called rational emotive behavior therapy from the 1950s, referred to the Stoics, and especially to Epictetus, throughout his writing, and the passage about views disturbing people is the one most often cited. Aaron Beck, the founder of cognitive therapy, drew on that line of thought largely through Ellis, and in a 1979 treatment manual he and his co authors described the doctrines of Stoicism as the philosophical origins of cognitive therapy, naming Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius among others.
Notice what that claim does and does not mean. It means that a central idea of modern cognitive therapy, that our feelings follow from how we interpret events, has an ancestor in this text. It does not mean that Stoicism is therapy, or that reading the Enchiridion treats depression or anxiety. The modern therapies add methods, evidence and professional care that the philosophers did not have. Commentators also point out that some therapists cite Ellis without reading the Stoics, and that scientific questions have been raised about Ellis's particular method that do not apply in the same way to Beck's. This lesson is about a philosophy, and it is not medical advice.
Now the hard edge. In chapter three of the Enchiridion, Epictetus tells you to remind yourself, about a favourite cup, that it is only a cup, so that if it breaks you can bear it. Then he says the same about those you love: if you embrace your child or your wife, remember that you embrace a mortal, and thus, if either of them dies, you can bear it. In chapter eleven he tells you never to say "I have lost it" but "I have restored it", even of a child. Many readers find this chilling. It can sound like a recommendation to love less.
What is he doing? One reading is that he is training the mind against the specific terror of loss, by rehearsing it in advance, the way a person rehearses a fire drill. Epictetus taught in a world where loss was common and political violence could arrive suddenly, and where some of his hearers had lost relatives and their freedom. The aim, on this reading, is to make grief survivable, not to make love absent. Another reading is that the advice asks too much of human feeling, and that a life with less attachment is a poorer one. Philosophers have argued both ways for two thousand years, and you can reasonably land on either side.
Epictetus is also easy to misread as a teacher of passivity. The drift of his sorting is the opposite: concentrate your effort on what is yours, and act well there. In the Enchiridion he compares life to a play in which you are an actor, and says your business is to act well the part given to you, though it belongs to another to choose it. A lame man, a poor man, a ruler and a private citizen all have the same task, which is to play the role well. That is not an invitation to do nothing. It is an invitation to refuse to be ruled by the parts you cannot play differently.
If you wanted to try it, the practice is small. When something upsets you, notice that the first reaction is an impression, as the first step in the diagram shows. Ask whether the thing concerns what is within your power. Then act on the part that is, and let the rest be. He says to begin with little things, a spilled bit of oil or a stolen cup of wine, and say to yourself that this is the price paid for peace and tranquillity, because nothing is to be had for nothing.
One last question, which no one can answer for you. Is it better to want less of what you cannot control, or to want it fully and accept the pain? Epictetus bet on the first. You may disagree. What he gives you is a clear question to ask yourself each time, and an example of a man who asked it from a position with very little power. The test of whether it works is not whether it sounds true. It is whether it lets you act well when something has gone wrong.
He did not teach people to feel nothing. He taught them to choose which part of an event to take as their own.
Epictetus asks us to notice impressions, sort what is within our power, and act on that part. The idea shaped modern cognitive therapy, it has a hard edge about loss, and it is a way of thinking, not a treatment.
- Why the famous leg story cannot be confirmed, and how we know Epictetus from a pupil's notes instead.
- What is within our power and what is not, in his own wording, and why he sorts the world that way.
- How an impression differs from a judgment, and where the pause between them lives.
- What he meant by freedom, and the question his idea leaves open about slavery.
- How Stoicism reached him, and how his notes reached an emperor.
- Where the idea helps, where it has a hard edge, and why it is philosophy and not treatment.
Texts quoted. The Enchiridion, in the translation by Thomas Wentworth Higginson (chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 11, 12, 14, 16 and 17). Epictetus, Discourses, in the translation by George Long, including his introduction, the opening discourse (with the Agrippinus story) and the passage on the freeing of a slave. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, in the Casaubon translation of 1634 (the thanks to Rusticus and the quotation from Epictetus). Celsus, as quoted by Origen in Against Celsus, book 7. Quotations are shown in those translations, with dashes in the originals replaced by commas.
Where the sources are uncertain. The cause of the lameness of Epictetus, the year he was freed, his birth year and the year Domitian banished the philosophers (given as about 89 to 93) are all uncertain. Some scholars doubt that the Discourses are Arrian's notes, though that is not the consensus. The links between Stoicism and modern cognitive therapy come from the writings of Ellis and Beck and from historians of psychotherapy.
This lesson is about a philosophy. It is not medical or psychological advice.